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Abstract  
This article examines the Irish variant of the Wages Councils; Joint Labour 
Committees, which set legally binding minimum pay and conditions for low paid 
workers in some sectors. We trace the reasons for the continued existence of the JLC 
system even after the introduction of a National Minimum Wage in 2000. We also 
examine its contemporary relevance and the prospects for its retention in the future, 
particularly in light of growing employer opposition to them.  
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Introduction 
A recent High Court case in Ireland by the Irish Hotels Federation against the system 
of Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) has brought renewed attention to minimum wage 
setting. Joint Labour Committees consist of trade union and employer representatives 
and independent members. They set legally binding minimum pay and conditions for 
low paid workers in some sectors and exist in addition to the National Minimum 
Wage (NMW). They are part of the contemporary Irish industrial relations regulatory 
framework and have the same origins as the UK Wages Councils system. Unlike the 
Wages Councils, which were abolished in 1993
2
, Irish JLCs have persisted. This 
paper seeks to examine why has the JLC system been retained? In addition, based on 
a survey of JLC members, we examine the relevance of the JLC system particularly in 
context of a NMW and the prospects for the retention of JLCs in the future. We 
conclude that the growth in service employment, the role of Irish social partnership, 
the Irish party political set-up and the views of employer bodies are seen as the key 
factors which insulated the JLC system from any serious challenge until recently. We 
find that trade union representatives on the JLCs support the retention of the system. 
While a majority of employer representatives on JLCs believe they are unnecessary 
and irrelevant, there is less consensus amongst them than trade unions. While 
employer organisations have in recent years sought the abolition of JLCs, they have 
engaged with government and trade unions through the social partnership process to 
achieve changes to the procedures JLCs use to set minimum pay and conditions, 
rather than pushing for abolition of the JLC system. 
 
 
                                                 
2
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What are Joint Labour Committees? 
Irish JLCs are statutory bodies which set minimum pay and conditions of employment 
in low paid employments where collective bargaining is poorly developed. Individual 
JLCs are composed of employer and worker representatives (usually from employer 
organisations and trade unions) and an independent chair. The system covers certain 
defined employments which, with the exception of agricultural employees, are at a 
subsectoral level. The Irish institutional framework operates on the basis of a 
voluntarist tradition, meaning minimum intervention by the law or third parties 
(including the State) in the employer-employee relationship. However, the terms and 
conditions set by JLCs are legally binding and apply equally to both union and non-
union employments. JLCs propose a set of minimum pay and conditions, which are 
drafted into an Employment Regulation Order (ERO) by the Labour Court, and this 
becomes law when promulgated by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment. Enforcement is not through the State’s industrial relations machinery 
but through the labour inspectorate of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment and employers may be prosecuted in the civil courts for breaches of an 
ERO. 
 
Until 2000, the JLC system had been the only statutory minimum wage system in 
Ireland but, as part of the 1997 general election campaign, the small neo-liberal 
Progressive Democrat party proposed the introduction of a national minimum wage. 
This proposal was included in the programme for government, after the Progressive 
Democrats and Ireland’s largest party, Fianna Fáil, were successful in that election. 
The resulting coalition Government quickly acted to set up a National Minimum 
Wage Commission to study the issues around the introduction of a NMW. The 
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Commission (1998:36) considered that “a radical assessment of the role and function 
of the JLC system will have to take place in the light of the Commission’s 
recommendation to introduce a national minimum wage”. However, no such review 
was undertaken by the Government and, when the NMW was introduced, the JLC 
system was retained unchanged. 
 
Origins and Trajectories of JLCs and Wages Councils 
Both the JLC and the former UK Wages Council systems owe their origin to the 
Trades Boards, which were introduced under the Trade Boards Act 1909. The Trades 
Boards were themselves products of a late nineteenth century debate on the effects of 
sweated labour. In 1894 the Royal Commission on Labour concluded that the “evils” 
[Commission’s term] of sweated working conditions arose from two factors: small 
employers undercutting larger ones due to intense competition and no trade union 
organisation of workers (British Royal Commission on Labour, 1894). Thus the 
Trades Boards were explicitly introduced to abolish the practice of ‘sweating’. Most 
famously, Winston Churchill declared at the time,  
“it is a serious national evil that any class of His Majesty’s subjects should 
receive less than a living wage in return for their utmost exertions. It was 
formerly supposed that the working of the laws of supply and demand would 
naturally regulate or eliminate that evil … but where you have no 
organisation, no parity of bargaining, the good employer is undercut by the 
bad, and the bad employer is undercut by the worst …  
(The United Kingdom Parliament, 1909: col388)   
This well-known quote sets out the fundamental arguments for regulation; namely 
that regulation is desirable where there is an absence of organisational representation 
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[chiefly trade unions] leading to an imbalance in the bargaining power between 
employers and workers. Regulation is seen as necessary to prevent the undermining of 
good employers, as much as to protect employees, and the free market laws of supply 
and demand are not considered adequate to provide this protection.  
 
In the UK, the Churchillian view of the need for regulation, which had been accepted 
for some 70 years, came under sustained attack in relation to the labour market 
generally, and Wages Councils in particular, following the election of the 
Conservative party in 1979. This attack lasted into the 1990s and the new philosophy 
was encapsulated in comments made by Michael Forsyth, former Minister of State for 
Employment (1992-1994); 
“Wages Councils are a barrier to employment, their abolition would improve 
job prospects for women. The biggest source of poverty is not low pay; it is 
having no job. Wages Councils destroy employment. It is better to have low 
pay than no jobs” (The United Kingdom Parliament, 1992).   
 
In effect, this neoclassical-based view reasserts the primacy of the laws of supply and 
demand and sees the free market as being preferable to regulation. Starting in 1980 
the protection afforded to low paid workers was progressively withdrawn in the UK. 
Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act 1975 was repealed in 1980. This 
Schedule had allowed claims to be taken to the Central Arbitration Committee against 
employers for observing less favourable terms and conditions than the general or 
recognised terms and conditions. The 1946 Fair Wage Resolution, which set 
minimum standards for workers on government contracts, was revoked in 1983. 
Under the 1986 Wages Act, the coverage and powers of the Wages Councils were 
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reduced e.g. under 21 year olds were removed from their coverage. In addition, the 
number of inspectors who monitored and enforced the Wages Council rates was cut 
from 158 in 1979 to 54 in 1992 (Callaghan and Jones, 1993). Wages Councils were 
eventually abolished by John Major’s Government under the terms of the Trade 
Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. According to Lucas (1991) an 
estimated an estimated 2.5 million workers had been covered by Wages Councils and 
protection was removed from them. This action was, in part, reversed with the 
adoption of a general minimum wage in 1999. 
 
Why have JLCs been retained in Ireland? 
The Trades Boards in the UK and Ireland had similar trajectories for many years. 
Their names were changed in the 1940s, to Wages Councils and JLCs respectively. 
Their powers were also increased in the 1940s. The 1945 Wages Councils Act 
provided for the Councils to cover all aspects of pay and holidays (Callaghan and 
Jones, 1993). In Ireland, the Industrial Relations Act 1946 allowed JLCs to propose 
regulations on conditions of employment in addition to setting minimum pay. Irish 
JLCs attracted little controversy either in periods of economic recession (during the 
1950s and 1980s), or periods of economic expansion (in the 1960s and the 1990s). 
Until the 1980s the Irish and British industrial relations systems shared common, 
mostly voluntarist features, however, since the advent of the Thatcher government in 
1979 there has been substantial divergence. The retention of the JLC system in 
Ireland, while the British equivalent institutional structure was abolished, is one 
aspect of this divergence. The question arises as to why public policy on labour 
standards for vulnerable workers has differed in the two jurisdictions? Three factors 
stand out as central in the retention of JLCs in Ireland. These are the role of the 
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growth in the services sector, the importance of the political landscape in Ireland and 
the views of employers. 
 
Growth of the Services Sector 
As with the Trades Boards, Irish JLCs were initially concentrated in low paid 
manufacturing employments characterised by weak trade union organisation. 
Examples were brush and broom manufacture, clothing, aerated waters, shirtmaking 
and women’s clothing and millinery. The number of workers covered by JLCs was 
traditionally a small minority of workers in Ireland, hovering around an estimated 
40,000 from the 1950s to the mid 1970s and declining to around 30,000 by the mid-
1980s (Figure 1). Had antiquated manufacturing employments continued to be the 
preserve of JLCs, it is probable they would have faced gradual extinction, not from 
ideological considerations as in the UK, but due to their decreasing relevance. 
However, the growth in service sector employment in the 1980s and 1990s changed 
the situation. From 1988 to 1997 service sector employment grew by 33 percent and 
with this growth came a number of problems (Wallace et al., 2001). Research 
internationally has noted the expansion in service employment as being characterised 
by increases in both “high road” and “low road” service jobs and Ireland shares in this 
bimodal division (cf. Dølvik, 2001). The low road jobs are characterised in Ireland by 
a high proportion of female employees, part-time employment, lower levels of 
education, lower availability of in-company training and low trade union density (cf. 
Hughes et al., 2004; Sexton et al., 2002). These characteristics, which were present in 
the Irish service sector expansion, led to the need for regulation and the JLC system, 
based on joint employer-trade union involvement, appealed in the context of the Irish 
model of social partnership. The earliest service sector JLC was established in 1947 
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(the Law Clerks JLC) and some extension of the JLCs in the services sector occurred 
in the 1960s and 1970s but all the most recent JLCs have been created for services 
employments. In 1990, 43 percent of JLCs covered services employments; by 2006 
this had risen to 58 percent (see Table 1). 
 
In 1984, an estimated 30,000 employees were covered by JLCs (Figure 1). By 1989 
this figure had risen to almost 65,000 (IRN, 1984; McMahon, 1991) and a decade 
later coverage had grown to an estimated 162,000 (National Minimum Wage 
Commission, 1998:29). This is the last official estimate on the number of workers 
covered by the JLCs. Using data from a variety of sources, we estimate that there are 
between 156,700 and 461,600 workers covered by the JLC system
3
. These figures, 
respectively, represent 9 and 25 percent of total employment in Ireland. The wide 
disparity in these figures is reflective of the unsatisfactory situation that precise data 
are not available on the current number of workers covered by the JLC system and no 
one has responsibility for providing coverage data. 
                                                 
3
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Figure 1 Estimate of Number of Workers Covered by JLC System, 1926-1998  
Source: Harris, 1930; Labour Court, 1954; Ireland, 1962; Ireland, 1976; IRN, 1984; 
McMahon, 1991; NMWC, 1998 
 
Table 1 Joint Labour Committees, 2008 
Year Established Joint Labour Committee
4
 Sector 
1914 Shirtmaking Industry  
1919 Brush & Broom Industry  
1920 Tailoring Industry  
1920 Women’s Clothing & Millinery Industry  
1920 Aerated Waters & Wholesale Bottlers Industry 
1935 Handkerchief & Household Piece Goods Industry  
1947 Law Clerks Services 
1960 Provender Milling Industry  
1964 Hairdressing (Dublin) Services 
1965 Hotels (excl. Dublin & Cork) Services 
                                                 
4
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1976 Agricultural Workers Agriculture 
1976 Catering (excl. County Dublin) Services 
1976 Hairdressing (Cork) Services 
1984 Contract Cleaning (City & County Dublin) Services 
1991 Retail Grocery & Allied Trades Services 
1993 Catering (County Dublin) Services 
1997 Hotels (Dublin) Services 
1998 Security Services 
1999 Contract Cleaning (excl. Dublin) Services 
Source:  Labour Court Annual Reports and Dáil (Parliament) Debates, various years  
 
Political Context 
The growth in low road jobs in the services sector provides a structural explanation 
for the growth in JLC coverage; however, as the service sector has also expanded in 
UK, it does not explain the reason for the persistence of the JLC system given the 
abolition of Wages Councils. A major contributor to the retention of the JLC system 
in Ireland has been the difference in the political framework in both countries. Wages 
Councils were rescinded and abolished during an era of Conservative party 
governments, which had a particularly strong neo-liberal ideology. This neo-liberal 
influence, which has not been unique to the UK, has led to varying degrees of dilution 
of employment regulation since the 1970s (cf. Farber and Western, 2002; Frege and 
Kelly, 2003; Kitson et al., 2000; O’Brien, 2000; Towers, 1989). In contrast, neo-
liberal political opposition to labour market regulation in Ireland has been muted and, 
in relation to JLCs, has been largely absent. The lack of political opposition to labour 
market regulation in Ireland can be ascribed to the make-up of the Irish multi-party 
political system.  
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In Ireland there are two major political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Both are 
centrist parties which have their origins in the nationalist divisions over the Anglo-
Irish Treaty of 1921. Fianna Fáil is the larger of the two parties and, since 1932, is the 
only party that has been able to form a government on its own. Fine Gael has only 
held power as part of a coalition, which has always involved the smaller Labour Party, 
the third largest party. Until their disbandment in 2008, the Progressive Democrats 
was a small neo-liberal party, which enjoyed considerable influence as part of 
coalition governments with Fianna Fáil from 1989-1992 and from 1997-2008. 
 
In the absence of a large social democratic or labour party, Fianna Fáil has long had 
links with the labour movement and has actively promoted corporatist labour market 
policies or, as they are referred to in Ireland, partnership approaches. As such it has 
not been in its electoral interest to engage in neo-liberal policies, which would have 
been seen to directly undermine workers’ interests. Thus, abolishing JLCs would 
make little sense for a Fianna Fáil led government. This is not to argue that Fianna 
Fáil has been opposed to neo-liberally inspired policies. They have, on their own and 
in government with the Progressive Democrats, embraced low personal and corporate 
tax rates, selective privatisation and other neo-liberal policies. However, unlike in the 
UK, labour market deregulation has not formed part of this agenda. While Fine Gael 
has not had similarly strong links with trade unions, it has only been in government as 
part of a coalition and, in most of these administrations, Labour has had responsibility 
for the government department handling industrial relations. As a result, coalitions 
involving Labour and Fine Gael effectively exclude the pursuit of an anti-regulation 
agenda based on neo-liberalism. There has been only one Fianna Fáil-Labour 
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coalition Government, from 1992 to 1994, and obviously it would have been in 
neither party’s interest to pursue aggressive neo-liberal labour market deregulation. 
 
While these differences between the three largest Irish parties are important, arguably 
the main political influence has been the approach adopted by the small Progressive 
Democrat party. This party, and Fianna Fáil, formed a coalition from 1989 to 1992 
and from 1997 to 2007. Post the May 2007 elections they were again part of a 
coalition, this time in conjunction with Fianna Fáil, the Green Party and a number of 
independents. However, their electoral performance in that election was dismal and 
the party subsequently voted to disband on the 10
th
 November 2008. The Progressive 
Democrat Party was the most right wing and pro-business political party in Ireland 
and the influence of Thatcher’s economic policies on the party has been noted 
(Raines, 1987). Given this categorisation it might be expected to have opposed labour 
market regulation, in general, and regulation by JLCs in particular. The party also 
held the Enterprise, Trade and Employment portfolio, including responsibility for 
industrial relations and JLCs from 1997 to 2004 and would have been in a position to 
advance any policies to decrease labour market regulation. However, in spite of the 
Progressive Democrats espousal of deregulating in commercial markets and their 
promotion of greater competition, they showed little sign of pursuing doctrinaire neo-
liberal policies when it comes to labour market regulation. They preferred instead to 
embrace the outcomes of the partnership negotiations. Indeed, there was a substantial 
increase in employment regulation and enforcement during the two earlier periods the 
Progressive Democrats were in government with Fianna Fáil (cf. Wallace and 
O’Sullivan, 2004).  
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While this approach by the Progressive Democrats might be ascribed to the 
compromises necessary to maintain power with the centrist Fianna Fáil party, this 
view is not supported by the facts.  Not only has the Progressive Democrat party 
readily embraced the outputs of national social partnership negotiations on labour 
market regulation but, as indicated earlier, it was that party that advanced a proposal 
for a NMW as part of the 1997 election. The Progressive Democrat’s leader, Mary 
Harney, when announcing the establishment of the National Minimum Wage 
Commission in 1997, stated “the Government is determined to stamp out exploitation 
of workers – that has no place in the Irish workplace…” (Sheehan, 1997:14). 
Subsequently she said that the NMW was a key priority for the Government so that 
those sectors of the labour force on low pay, especially women and young people, 
would get a better share of the fruits of economic growth (Irish Times, 2000). The 
tone of these statements contrasts with those of Michael Forsyth in 1993 and indicates 
a distinct difference in hue between the neo-liberalism of the Progressive Democrats 
and that of the UK Conservative party under both Margaret Thatcher and John Major. 
 
Employer Attitudes  
The third major factor favouring the retention of JLCs has been the attitude of 
employer organisations. For much of the life of JLCs, employers adopted a generally 
benign attitude to them, with expressions of dissatisfaction generally centred on 
operational issues. In fact, at various times when a national minimum wage was 
mooted, employers opposed its introduction and pointed to the JLCs as meeting the 
needs for protection of vulnerable workers. This approach is most notable in the 
submissions made by employer bodies to the National Minimum Wage Commission. 
The main Irish employer organisation, the Irish Business and Employer Confederation 
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(IBEC), opposed the introduction of a national minimum wage and claimed that the 
JLC system had proved its worth (NMWC, 1998; Sheehan, 1998). The Irish Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises (ISME) – a body generally opposed to regulation and 
national partnership agreements – opted for the retention of the JLC system which 
could “review sector by sector and establish minimum terms of conditions appropriate 
to each” (Yeates, 1997:17). Smaller sectoral employer bodies echoed this approach. 
The Irish Retail Newsagents Association argued that the JLC system had “ensured 
acceptable statutory wage rates by negotiation between employee and employer 
representatives” (NMWC, 1998:35). The Irish Hotels Federation suggested that the 
JLC system was “the most appropriate” system for setting minimum wages and 
suggested its extension, if needed (NMWC, 1998:35).  
 
Thus far, we have identified the growth of the services sector, the particular political 
landscape and the supportive/benign attitudes of employers as contributory factors to 
the retention of the JLCs. Their retention does not a priori mean that they are 
relevant. The relevance of JLCs has been a particularly pertinent issue since the 
introduction of a NMW. If a NMW already exists, are JLCs relevant anymore? We 
examine this question in the next section through a survey of JLC members. 
 
Research Methodology 
The research design took the form of a survey of JLC members conducted between 
November 2004 and March 2005. JLCs are composed of between six and 15 
representative employer members and equal numbers of representative worker 
members and a smaller number of independent members. The larger the number of 
unions or employer organisations in an industry, the greater the number of worker and 
employer members on the JLC. Most of the worker representatives were trade union 
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officials and shop stewards affiliated with Ireland’s largest trade union, SIPTU, and 
some with MANDATE (the union for retail, bar and administrative workers) and the 
UK based union, the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union 
(ATGWU)
5
. On the employer side, most representatives are officials with IBEC. 
Other employer organisations represent specific sectoral employers. For example, the 
Irish Hotels Federation is represented on the Catering and Hotels JLCs, the Irish 
Farmers Association is represented on the Agricultural JLC and Law Society of 
Ireland is on the Law Clerks JLC. The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment appoints independent members of JLCs. Most JLCs have one 
independent member – the chairperson – while some have a second. The selection 
process of independent members is a low profile one with little or no consultation 
with trade unions or employer bodies. Most chairpersons of JLCs are Industrial 
Relations Officers from the Labour Relations Commission
6
. Other sources for 
chairperson are former members of the Labour Relations Commission, senior officers 
of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), IBEC and the Labour Court. 
Chairpersons, appointed before the establishment of the Labour Relations 
Commission in 1991, generally do not have specific industrial relations backgrounds, 
for example, one chairperson at the time of the survey was a university lecturer. 
Chairpersons have a potentially critical role on JLCs because they have a casting vote 
where employer and trade union representatives cannot agree on proposed minimum 
pay and conditions.  
 
There are 164 JLC members, of which 106 (76 employer members, 67 worker 
members and 21 independent members) responded to the questionnaire, giving a 
                                                 
5
 The Irish branch of the TGWU was the ATGWU, it is now part of Unite.  
6
 The Labour Relations Commission is a State dispute resolution body. Its primary service is 
conciliation and this is staffed by Industrial Relations Officers. 
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response rate of 65 percent. Over two-thirds of all employer members responded 
(68%), 60 percent of all worker members responded and 67 percent of independent 
members responded. Attitudinal questions were asked on the necessity and relevance 
of JLCs, the reasons for members’ opinions and their views on the future of JLCs.  
 
Perceived Necessity and Relevance of JLCs 
Two thirds of respondents considered that JLCs were still necessary, in addition to the 
NMW, while a third thought that they were not necessary (Table 2). The 
overwhelming majority of trade union and independent members believed JLCs were 
necessary. Unsurprisingly, employer members were most likely to hold the view that 
JLCs were no longer necessary; however, there was not a consensus amongst them. A 
substantial minority of one-third of employer respondents believed JLCs were 
necessary. To ascertain the reasons for these employers’ view that JLCs are necessary, 
respondents were provided with a Likert scale. The reasons with the strongest 
employer support were that ‘JLCs are necessary because they tailor minimum pay and 
conditions to the specific industry/employment covered’ (33% of employers) and that 
‘JLCs are necessary because they try to prevent employer undercutting’ (33% of 
employers) – a reason reminiscent of Winston Churchill’s comments. Other well 
supported reasons were that ‘JLCs provide a negotiating forum for generally non-
unionised workers’ (27% of employers); that ‘JLCs set more minimum conditions of 
employment than provided in employment legislation’ (25% of employers) and that 
‘JLCs help workers out of low pay’ (25% of employers). 
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Table 2 Views on JLC Necessity in addition to the National Minimum Wage 
Categorised by JLC Member Group (n=106) (%) 
Relevance Trade union (n=40) Employer (n=52) Independent (n=14) 
Necessary 97.5 34.6 85.7 
Not necessary 2.5 65.4 14.3 
Total 100 100 100 
 
There is a difference in conception between whether JLCs are necessary and whether 
they are relevant. In general, the difference in views on the necessity and relevance of 
JLCs between employer respondents and others was retained. Interestingly, a higher 
percentage of trade union members believed JLCs were irrelevant compared to the 
percentage that considered them unnecessary (Tables 2 and 3). These results, while 
informed by the experience of the JLC members, are subjective and do not give a 
view of the actual impact of JLCs on pay and terms and conditions of employment 
The next section analyses the difference between JLC rates of pay and the NMW.  We 
also examine the minimum conditions of employment set by JLCs.  
 
Table 3 Views on the Relevance of JLCs in light of the NMW Categorised by 
JLC Member Group (n=102) (%) 
Relevance Trade union (n=38) Employer (n=50) Independent (n=14) 
Highly relevant/ 
Somewhat relevant 
79 22 78.5 
Neither relevant nor 
irrelevant 
5.3 18 7.1 
Somewhat/now 
irrelevant 
15.8 60 14.3 
Total 100 100 100 
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Minimum Rates of Pay 
In order to examine the actual impact of JLC regulation, we compared the difference 
between a sample of JLC minimum rates of pay and NMW rates between April 2000 
and December 2008 (Table 4). The difference between the NMW and the JLC rates 
gives an indication of the order of magnitude of the impact. Thirty-four percent of 
rates were between 5% and 10% above the NMW, eleven percent were between 10% 
and 15% and thirteen percent were in excess of 15% above the NMW (Table 4). It can 
be seen from the differences between the respective JLC rates and NMW rates 
analysed, that the JLC system has a greater impact on minimum wage rates in some 
JLC employments than others. Overall, 70 percent of the JLC rates were less than 10 
percent in excess of the NMW and 36 percent were less than five percent over the 
NMW (Table 5).   
 
Table 4 JLC Rates Compared with NMW, 2000-2008 
NMW Rate 
 
Date NMW Introduced and 
Increased 
Number of JLC Rates 
analysed against NMW 
£4.40 April 2000 26 
£4.70 July 2001 24 
€6.35 October 2002 (I) 30 
€6.35 October 2002 (II) 27 
€7 February 2004 34 
€7.65 May 2005 34 
€8.657 July 2007 33
8
 
Source: Derived from EROs 
 
                                                 
7
 There was an additional increase in the NMW to €8.30 but it only existed between January and June 
2007. 
8
 The JLC rates analysed are the rates set as of December 2008. 
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Table 5 Number of JLC Rates by difference with NMW, 2000-2008 
NMW Rate Less than 
NMW 
0-4.9% over 
NMW 
5-9.9% over 
NMW 
10-14.9% 
over NMW 
15% & over 
NMW 
£4.40 1 12 7 3 3 
£4.70 0 8 6 5 5 
€6.359 0 13 9 4 4 
€6.35 0 0 16 5 6 
€7 1 21 5 4 3 
€7.6510 13 12 5 1 3 
€8.65 0 8 23 0 2 
Totals 15 74 71 22 26 
Note: Most JLCs set minimum weekly wages so the hourly rate was derived by 
dividing the weekly minimum by 39 hours. 
Source: Derived from analysis of EROs 
 
The Minimum Conditions Function 
The fact that JLCs set minimum conditions of employment increases the complexity 
of the debate on JLC relevance beyond merely minimum wage setting. An 
examination of EROs in operation in 2008 indicates that a significant array of 
minimum conditions is set by JLCs (Table 6).  There are three ‘types’ of minimum 
conditions in EROs. The first are those which merely duplicate provisions already in 
existence – for example there already is a legislative obligation on employers to 
provide written statements of terms of employment to employees (Table 6). The 
second type is those minimum conditions which build on legislative provisions in 
place, for example, rest breaks. The third type, and the most common type of 
minimum condition, is those unregulated by legislation. These include overtime pay, 
service pay and sick pay schemes and are likely to be of substantial concern to 
                                                 
9
 Two sets of comparisons were undertaken for one NMW rate (€6.35). This is because a substantial 
number of JLCs increased their rates in 2003 during the term of the €6.35 NMW. 
10
 13 JLC rates analysed were below the NMW of €7.65. This is because NMW increases often do not 
occur at the same time as JLC rate increases. A number of JLCs had not agreed a new ERO in time 
before the NMW was increased but did so shortly after.  
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employees (Table 6). An additional advantage of JLCs, as noted earlier, is that the 
minimum conditions can be tailored to the particular industry covered; something 
which Government-set legislation is unable to do. For example, the Security JLC 
provides a benefit to those workers who are attacked in the course of their work. 
 
Table 6 Number of JLCs with Minimum Conditions of Employment, 2008  
Minimum  Condition No. of 
JLCs 
Minimum Condition No. of 
JLCs 
Overtime pay 16 Board & lodgings 2 
Working hours 15 Terms of employment statement 2 
Annual leave 15 Negotiation rights 2 
Introduction of bullying/ 
harassment /grievance/ 
disciplinary procedures 12 Protection of employment 2 
Specific dismissal procedures 11 Disclosure of information 2 
Sick pay 10 Union dues 2 
Service pay 8 Training 2 
Breaks 6 
Change of address information to 
employee 2 
Conditions of 
apprenticeship/learnership 6 
Revenue Commissioner 
contribution information 2 
Certificate of service 5 Shift pay 2 
Pension 3 Compassionate leave 1 
Spreadover duty 3 Service charge 1 
Continuity of employment 3 Facilities 1 
Death in service benefit 3 Personal attack benefit 1 
Waiting time 3 Maternity 1 
Minimum notice 3   
Source: Derived from EROs 
The number and range of minimum conditions established by different JLCs varies 
significantly. For instance, the Law Clerks ERO has only three minimum conditions 
of employment, while the Contract Cleaning ERO (excluding Dublin) have 16 
minimum conditions. The reason for the variation appears, with some exceptions, to 
be closely related to the age of the JLC. The general tendency is that newer JLCs have 
more conditions set by them than older ones (Figure 2). These newer JLCs also cover 
the expanding services sector and therefore the greatest proportion of workers covered 
 21 
by EROs. Taken together, both the number and variety of additional conditions set by 
JLCs and their customised nature indicates that there is a significant supplementary 
function fulfilled by JLCs which is not met by legislation.  
 
Figure 2 Average Number of Conditions of Employment by Age of JLCs, 2008 
 
Source: Derived from EROs 
 
Views on the Future of JLCs: Survey Responses  
Three quarters of survey respondents indicated that the JLC system should be retained 
in some form, while a quarter felt it should be abolished. The figure opting for 
retention is higher than the proportion of respondents who considered JLCs to be 
necessary. As expected, the vast majority of trade union and independent members 
believed that the JLC system should be retained in some form. Relatively equal 
percentages of employer respondents believed the JLC system should be retained or 
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abolished. This is somewhat surprising given that two-thirds of employer respondents 
had previously indicated that JLCs were not necessary.  
 
Table 7 Views on the Future of JLCs Categorised by JLC Group (n=106) (%) 
Future of JLCs Worker (n=40) Employer (n=52) Independent 
(n=14) 
Retained in current form 22.5 11.5 23.1 
Retained & extended 62.5 9.6 46.2 
Retained but some amalgamated/ 
abolished 
 
12.5 30.7 23.1 
Abolished 2.5 48.1 7.7 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Growing Opposition to JLCs and Social Partnership 
Ireland has had a system of national social partnership in place since 1987, in which 
Government, trade unions, employer organisations as well as the representatives of 
the farming and voluntary sectors have negotiated on pay increases and economic and 
social policy. Following the introduction of the NMW in 2000, the generally 
supportive/benign attitude of employer organisations towards JLCs changed 
somewhat when IBEC sought a review of the operation of JLCs under the social 
partnership process. The Labour Relations Commission was given the responsibility 
for commissioning the review and the authors of this paper conducted the review in 
2005. Unsurprisingly, IBEC argued in the review that the JLC system should be 
abolished given the existence of the NMW and employment legislation (see Dobbins, 
2005). However, IBEC also noted that if the system were retained, it wanted to see the 
introduction of more employer-friendly provisions such as inability-to-pay claims. As 
expected, the ICTU argued for JLCs’ retention and believed “there is a zone where 
JLCs are effective; they are above minimum rates and they are below unionised 
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rates…. The whole collective nature of the JLC is a very good way for collectively 
vindicating worker rights” (Dobbins, 2005). Of particular significance though was the 
fact that State bodies had expressed their support for JLCs in the review. The Labour 
Court stated that  
“JLCs provide protection in areas that workers wouldn’t otherwise have, such 
as overtime, shift allowances, pensions, sick pay. The National Minimum 
Wage and legislation has partly replaced the JLCs. However, given the 
‘package’ of protection they provide on other issues, it is difficult to see them 
being replaced in the short run”.     (Dobbins, 2005) 
In addition, the Labour Court noted that “even where [JLC rates] are just 10 or 15 
cents above the NMW level, workers would expect to retain that. In the security 
industry rates are 10%-20% higher” (Dobbins, 2005). The Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment/Labour Inspectorate believed that JLCs  
“are relevant in particular sectors. They cover those areas of employment 
where the natural structure of them means that the people employed in 
establishments are not quite in the same negotiating position, same strength of 
relationship (with their employer) that people in large factories for example 
would have. There would be a question as to how those workers would be 
represented if JLCs were discontinued?” (Dobbins, 2005). 
 
The review concluded that the JLC system should be retained based on a strong 
majority view amongst interested stakeholders but that reforms should be introduced 
to allow for mergers and the abolition of older JLCs which were no longer relevant. 
Events outside the JLC system also decreased any possibility that it would be 
abolished. By the time the review of JLCs was conducted in 2005, trade unions had 
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launched a campaign against what was termed “the race to the bottom”, sparked by 
two high profile disputes in GAMA Construction and Irish Ferries, involving breaches 
of labour standards. With negotiations on a new national partnership agreement 
looming, trade unions made the agreement on measures to uphold labour standards a 
pre-condition of any new agreement and also sought a major increase in the number 
of labour inspectors. As a result, the abolition of the JLCs was not an option if a new 
agreement were to be reached. Subsequently, the national partnership agreement, 
Towards 2016, agreed in 2006, provided for the retention of JLCs with some 
provisions for modernisation. In addition, there were undertakings to create a new 
labour rights body, the National Employment Rights Agency and to expand the 
number of labour inspectors from 31 to 90. Thus, despite employer protestations, 
JLCs were retained and employment rights enforcement was strengthened through 
agreement. Given the high profile disputes in GAMA and Irish Ferries, employers 
would have been aware that any dilution of worker protection was unrealistic, if an 
agreement were to be concluded. 
However, in 2008, a hotel employer and the Irish Hotels Federation together launched 
a legal attack on JLCs. They took a High Court case to challenge the Labour Court 
and Hotels JLC, with particular reference to an ERO made in 2007. The General 
Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions commented that “the objectives of 
the legal proceedings upon which the Hotels Federation has embarked is to eliminate 
the protection offered by the Labour Court to the largest body of migrant workers in 
the State” (Higgins, 2008a). This refers to the fact that large numbers of migrant 
workers work in JLC-covered sectors like hotels, catering and retail (CSO, 2006). In 
their challenge, the employers firstly argued that the powers of the Labour Court to 
issue an ERO were unconstitutional because it could set minimum wage laws without 
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legislative or parliamentary control. Secondly, employers’ counsel argued that the 
procedures applied to the setting of a Hotels ERO in 2007 were not fair or transparent. 
When the JLC met in 2007 to set an ERO, different proposals were put forward by the 
employer and trade union representatives on the sequencing of two sets of pay rises – 
the NMW increase from July 2007 as well as any further wage increases as decided 
by the JLC (JLCs generally automatically apply the wage increases set in national 
partnership agreements). The trade union representatives proposed that the national 
minimum wage increase would apply first, followed by additional JLC increases. The 
employers’ representatives proposed the opposite - that JLC increases would apply 
first, then the national minimum wage increase (Higgins, 2008b). The trade union 
representatives’ proposal would be more costly for employers. The chairman of the 
JLC rejected the employers’ proposal on the sequencing of the pay rises. In the High 
Court, the employers’ counsel argued that the process of setting the ERO was unfair 
because the chairman had not informed the Labour Court of the employers’ economic 
report on rising labour costs in the hotel sector.  
 
In the event, the case was settled out of court. The Labour Court and the Hotels JLC 
paid the costs of the employer side and conceded that the correct procedures had not 
been followed regarding the Hotels ERO in question and it was quashed. Higgins 
(2008c) reports that a deal made between ICTU and IBEC on JLC reform could have 
addressed some of the Irish Hotels’ Federation concerns prior to the settlement of the 
High Court case. An agreement was made on the sequencing of pay rises - that JLC 
pay increases would be applied before NMW increases. In return, employers agreed to 
a mechanism to review an ERO if there was a delay in introducing it. An ERO, which 
was not introduced to coincide with the ending of a previous one, had long been a 
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source of frustration for trade unions because it meant that new wage increases to 
employees were delayed.  In addition to the ICTU/IBEC deal, the Government 
quickly moved to ensure the difficulties identified as part of the out-of-court 
settlement would be addressed. The Minister for Enterprise and Employment, Micheál 
Martin, said he was “not impressed” with the legal challenge and that “the 
Government will take whatever legislative steps are necessary to protect the existing 
legal mechanism …” (Sheehan, 2008). A new national partnership agreement was 
signed in autumn 2008 (Towards 2016 - Transitional Agreement) and this continued 
the process of seeking to preserve the JLC system. The social partners committed to 
the introduction of legislation to strengthen the system of making EROs and to allow 
for consultation with the social partners on the appointment of chairmen for individual 
JLCs (Department of the Taoiseach, 2008). In addition, a working party consisting of 
IBEC, ICTU and the Labour Court has proposed to rationalize JLCs, which if 
implemented, would provide for a reduction of JLCs from 19 to 12 (IRN, 2008). 
 
 
Conclusion: The Future of JLCs 
After many years of being accepted as part of Ireland’s industrial relations regulatory 
framework, JLCs became the subject of controversy after the introduction of the 
NMW.  Our survey shows that trade union representatives on JLCs overwhelmingly 
believe that they are necessary. In contrast, two-thirds of employer representatives on 
JLCs indicated that they are no longer necessary but over half supported their 
retention. While it was thought that JLCs’ future was secured under the national 
partnership agreement of 2006, the High Court challenge by the Irish Hotels 
Federation temporarily threw the system into a state of uncertainty.   Higgins (2008c) 
notes that the settlement was a “clever tactical retreat” by the Labour Court and JLC 
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given that the constitutional issue “could have seriously undermined whole chunks of 
the employment rights machinery of the State if it had been upheld by the High 
Court”. Since the settlement, the Irish Hotels Federation has returned to the Hotels 
JLC to set another ERO. Its chief executive, John Power, said: “Our hope is that the 
Hotels JLC procedures will result in an enlightened and transparent process as a result 
of the significant outcome today” (Higgins, 2008c). These comments, the comments 
made by IBEC in the review of JLCs, the deal between the ICTU and IBEC and the 
provisions of the most recent national partnership agreement suggest that the 
employers’ real interest was not to abolish the JLC system but to ensure that JLCs 
took greater cognisance of employer concerns regarding procedural issues. Following 
the High Court case, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment provided 
reassurance to trade unions by commenting “we will certainly be at one with the trade 
union side in terms of making sure that this particular edifice is shored up in whatever 
way it takes…. We believe in common basic standards and will do whatever we have 
to” (Wall, 2008). The support of the Government for JLCs and importantly employer 
bodies to retain and strengthen JLCs again demonstrates the difference in political 
landscapes between Ireland and the UK.  
 
Despite the political support for the JLC system, the possibility remains that any 
individual employer could take another case on constitutional principles and this 
could strike down the JLC system, irrespective of what the employers and unions 
agree. Paradoxically, the greater enforcement of EROs arising out of the 
strengthening of the labour inspectorate has led some employers to complain that the 
rates set by the JLCs do not match the new commercial realities. For instance, 
O’Brien’s Sandwich Bars claimed it is being forced to cut jobs because of greater 
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enforcement of the Sunday premiums set out in EROs (Higgins, 2008d). There is 
therefore continuing controversy at the operation of JLCs. Because the constitutional 
question of the limitations on the delegation of lawmaking powers was untested in the 
hotels High Court case, a challenge taken on these grounds cannot be ruled out. If 
successful, this could prove difficult for the Government and the social partners as 
any change to the Irish Constitution requires a referendum and governments are 
frequently reluctant to engage in such a course of action. For the short to medium 
term, the most recent social partnership agreement and the deal between ICTU and 
IBEC has satisfied employer concerns but the JLC system’s long term future will 
depend on how the JLCs respond to employers’ criticisms in practice. 
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